After too many nights of pulling children from the rubble of Russian drone strikes, the weekend’s devastating attacks on Moscow’s military pride mark a moment of brief respite for Ukrainian morale, and yet another twist of the unexpected in the Kremlin’s war of choice.
It may be hard to fathom the precise impact of Ukraine’s wily drone assault on Russian air bases thousands of miles beyond the Ukrainian border. Kyiv said 41 long-range bomber jets were set aflame and that the attacks hit 34% of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers at its main bases.
We don’t know how many bombers Russia had that were fully functional – after years of taxing nightly missions over Ukraine – and how many others had been cannibalized for spare parts, but some reports suggest Russia only had about 20 of the propeller-driven Tu-95s and about 60 supersonic Tu-22M3s in service.
It will become clear in the months ahead to what extent this really dents the terror the air raid sirens bring across Ukraine. But if what Kyiv says is true – 117 relatively cheap drones taking out dozens of planes and causing what one security source estimated to be $7 billion in damage – then the economics of the war have shifted.
And it marks another point in which guile triumphs over the giant. Russia’s main card is its vastness – of military resources, frontline manpower, tolerance for pain and financial reserves. But repeatedly, Kyiv has shown targeted pin pricks can burst these bubbles.
In late 2022, the Ukrainians struck supply lines across occupied northern parts of Ukraine, causing a swift and embarrassing collapse of Russian positions. In 2023, they hit the Kerch Strait bridge linking Russia to occupied Crimea. And last year they invaded Kursk, Russia proper, exposing the vulnerability of the Russian war machine’s borders.
On each occasion, the narrative of the war swung back in Ukraine’s favor. But no time is it needed more than this week, after months in which the vital plank of US support has been in doubt, and as Russian and Ukrainian delegations met for a second round of peace talks in Turkey.
It also brings to the forefront one of the key lessons of this war: the capacity for advances in technology, solid intelligence and bold execution to reverse military trajectories many observers felt were settled. Ukraine’s first use of attack drones in 2023 has evolved to a widescale tactic, enabling it to survive the onslaught of overwhelming Russian infantry attacks across wide, imperiled frontlines. It has sent sea-drones to hit Russia’s prized Black Sea Fleet.
And most extraordinarily, this weekend, Ukraine says its air defenses repelled, with unparalleled success, a record Russian drone attack of 472 Shaheds. Ukraine shot down or used electronic warfare to block 382 of them, according to the air force, a feat that again suggests a technological advance, and the possibility that dwindling air defense interceptor supplies from the United States may not be the immediate horrific threat thought a month ago.
But what of the wider impact of the bold drone attack inside Russia – one so deep, in Belaya, Irkutsk, that it was almost halfway across Siberia? What does it change in a war where Russia is slowly advancing, and showing little genuine interest in a ceasefire and the peace that might come with it? This is an unknowable, but not a zero. Losing these aircraft has a practical effect, and impacts upon Russian military pride and anxiety. Even airfields deep in Siberia are not safe.
Russia’s lumbering bulk of a military machine projects invulnerability and fearlessness towards the longest of wars as a tactic. It uses the idea of time being on its side as a key asset. But strikes like the weekend’s show its hardware is vulnerable, limited and probably not easy to replace.
Moscow may brush off this latest setback, its rigidly subservient state media able to sustain any narrative the Kremlin chooses. But that does not alter the reality of its troubles. It did not stop the short-lived Wagner rebellion of 2023, or the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk last year.
The damage is twofold: to the internal narrative that Moscow can do this indefinitely – it clearly cannot, if surprises like these keep coming. And secondly, to its ability to visit the sort of bulk destruction it has relied upon to grind forwards in the war. The latter can slow its progress, but former is more dangerous. Tiny cracks can spread. For now, they are all Ukraine is able to inflict, but their longer-term impact, like so much in this war, is utterly unpredictable.
