When pagers exploded across Lebanon last week, the year-long war with Hezbollah was not at the top of the Israeli political agenda.
Instead, the political class was convulsed with speculation that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was set to fire Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and replace him with a military neophyte, Gideon Sa’ar, to shore up his domestic power. National security heavyweights were scathing. “It’ll take him months on end to train for the job,” said Gadi Eisenkot, a highly respected former Israeli military chief and member of the opposition.
The pager and subsequent walkie-talkie explosions – which together killed dozens, maimed thousands, and rattled Lebanese nerves – put paid to that scheme, for now. The suddenly heightened tensions with Hezbollah gave Gallant a lifeline. Reports in the Israeli press suggest that the stay on Gallant’s dismissal is only temporary, and that Netanyahu still intends to fire him.
Policy and domestic politics are impossible to separate in any democracy, but especially in Netanyahu’s Israel – and especially now.
Political imperatives
The Israeli government says it needed to ramp up the war with Hezbollah to return 60,000 displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel. Since the day after the October 7 attacks by Hamas, Hezbollah has been firing on Israel in solidarity with the militant group and Palestinians in Gaza. Hundreds of thousands have also been forced from their homes by Israeli bombardment in Lebanon.
Returning the northern residents home is a political imperative in Israel. And since the cabinet formally added the goal to its war aims, it’s a policy one too. But the heightened war with Hezbollah also stands in the way of Netanyahu’s desire to fire Gallant.
Just this week, after giving the green light to a US-backed mediation effort with Lebanon, the prime minister faced withering criticism from his right-wing allies, who say only a military conflict will remove Hezbollah from the border. Ben Gvir’s party held an urgent consultation – implicitly threatening to upend the coalition. The criticism forced Netanyahu to release a statement rejecting the idea of an imminent ceasefire. When he later put out another statement saying that he was engaging in the process with the United States, he only released it in English, not Hebrew.
In attacking Hezbollah, the Israeli government is trying to “decouple” Lebanon from Gaza. Hezbollah says that it’s attacking Israel in solidarity with the Palestinian people in Gaza; Israel wants to get Hezbollah to stop firing even without a Gaza ceasefire and hostage deal. And yet there is a widespread assumption among the national security class in Israel that Netanyahu is prolonging the war in Gaza because he knows that as soon as it is over, he will face enormous pressure to call an election.
The families of the 101 people still held hostage in Gaza regularly accuse the prime minister of playing for time and putting his political survival above the national interest.
“If Netanyahu wanted to end it, he could. So I guess that’s not his intention at this point.”
Long-running tensions
The prime minister and Gallant have long had strained relations, despite a period of unity following Hamas’ October 7 attack.
The two have often disagreed over the war in Gaza. In August, Gallant told a closed-door Knesset committee that Netanyahu’s goal of “absolute victory” in Gaza was “nonsense,” according to Israeli media. Netanyahu took the extraordinary step of releasing a press statement accusing Gallant of adopting an “anti-Israel narrative.”
Gallant was also highly critical of Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israeli control of a strip of territory along the Gaza-Egypt border, known as the Philadelphi Corridor, calling it a “moral disgrace.” In cabinet, he voted against continued occupation there, seeing it as a hinderance to a ceasefire and hostage deal. “If we want the hostages alive, we don’t have time,” he said.
With both the Philadelphi Corridor and Hezbollah, Netanyahu’s critics have questioned why, if they were so critical, he waited months to raise the stakes over those issues. Netanyahu has said in response that it was a “progression of military advancement.”
Indeed, when the prime minister previously attempted to dismiss Gallant, in March last year, it was over the defense minister’s opposition to Netanyahu’s proposed judicial overhaul – an issue that had the potential to bring down the government.
The idea that Gallant might be fired over the judicial reforms led immediately to mass protests that came to be known in Israel as the “Night of Gallant.” Ultimately, Netanyahu did not follow through. One of the factors weighing on Netanyahu in his hesitance to fire him now has been fear of a second such night.
The exemption question
Behind the headlines of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, Netanyahu’s ability to govern has long been threatened by a seemingly back-burner issue: the Israeli military’s recruitment of ultra-Orthodox Israelis, known in Hebrew as Haredim.
“The danger to the coalition connected to the draft law for the Haredim is very high,” Malach said. “So (Netanyahu) would do the things that will help him keep the coalition. And if Gallant is in his way to keep the coalition, he will do whatever he can to remove him from the office.”
The issue of ultra-Orthodox military service has long plagued Israel. Ultra-Orthodox Jews had since Israel’s founding been exempt from mandatory service, because they viewed Torah study as the highest calling. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court said that the exemption violated equal protection principles and mandated the IDF to start drafting.
Ever since, the ultra-Orthodox parties on whom Netanyahu relies to govern have been trying to draft legislation to enshrine a new exemption in law. Up until now, they have been notably unwilling to follow through on threats to leave the coalition – rarely have they had so much power. But their unhappiness with the IDF’s current mandate to recruit ultra-Orthodox men remains a sword of Damocles.
Gallant is a thorn in Netanyahu’s side, pushing him not to give in to the ultra-Orthodox desire for an exemption. He, like many military leaders, thinks that all Jewish Israelis should share the burden of military service – and has said he won’t support any law that doesn’t have broad political support.
Sa’ar, whom Netanyahu wanted to replace Gallant, was said to have much better relations with the ultra-Orthodox parties.
Eisenkot, the former IDF chief of the General Staff, said the ultra-Orthodox issue was central to Netanyahu’s desire to get rid of the defense minister.
“Firing Gallant – and I’m not a fan of Gallant – is meant to serve political needs, to pass the conscription law, consequently damaging the IDF,” he said. “This is more of Netanyahu’s cynical policy.”
With Netanyahu’s backing, the ultra-Orthodox parties hope to pass a military exemption when the Knesset returns following the Jewish High Holidays in October. Even if the law passes, the Supreme Court is almost certain to knock it down, Malach said.
“But the point is that you are getting time. And this is the most important thing for Netanyahu,” he said. “The short term is the whole term for him. Because until the Supreme Court will decide, he will get one year, two years – that’s enough.”
That short-term strategy may well come to apply to Hezbollah as well. Amid all the talk of whether Israel will invade Lebanon in the coming days, there is no discussion of what a long-term settlement with Israel’s neighbor might look like.
Michael Shemesh, a correspondent for Israeli broadcaster Kan traveling with Netanyahu to New York this week, said that reporters asked an aide to the prime minister about the potential that Gallant might be fired.
“We don’t do politics during wartime,” the aide replied. “There were reporters who couldn’t help but laugh,” Shemesh said.
